Army Bob: The tools and strategy of war changing

by Robert M. Traxler

The war in Ukraine continues with very little movement on either side; the outcome may depend on who has the will to outlast the other.

Quite frankly, I am a bit puzzled as to why the Russian Federation does not use its Airborne and/or Airmobile forces to make deep penetration attacks in more than one location at a set time. The Russian Armiya has the airborne and airmobile forces to insert in the Ukraine rear, cutting off supply lines and disrupting lines of communications. Russian Spetsnaz forces number nearly 17,000 highly trained and superbly equipped elite troops and have not been seen in strength since the opening months of the war. 

The lessons learned in this conflict may just be the end of military science as we know it. It is certainly the end of war as I was taught to fight it at the Infantry/Armor/Military Police schools and Command and General Staff College. The use of drones and missiles, together with satellite intelligence and advanced radar systems like counter battery systems, have reduced the Ukraine war from one of fire and maneuver to one of fixed positions.

Tanks that were the masters of the battlefield are now much more vulnerable; even the vaunted Russian T-90 main battle tanks and the Leporid II, an excellent German design, have seen massive losses and tank-on-tank battles have been rare in this war.

We will see when the American M1 Abrams sees action in this conflict if it fares any better, but probably not. The Abrams is the best tank in the world, but the T-90 and Leporid II are only marginally less capable. 

The Russian Armiya lost its best chance for a quick victory in the opening weeks of the war due to the bane of every army since the days of Alexander III of Macedon: logistics. The Russians just ran out of beans, band aids, bullets and fuel. They were close to encircling Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, but literally ran out of gas.

The Russians had major units of the ZSU (Ukrainian Army) encircled in the Donbass Region but could not finish them, in part due to a lack of munitions and fuel. The Ukrainians pulled off a breakout maneuver that was very difficult and complex, to their credit, and survived to fight another day. 

An old saying is that amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur put it simply, “The history of all lost causes can be summed up in four words, too little too late.”

Indeed, the tooth-to-tail ratio of a modern army (picture a dog, the mouth does the damage, the rest of the dog behind the teeth is in support of the biting teeth) is 80 to 90% involved primarily in logistics and maintenance operations to every warrior in battle. 

The Russians, of all armies, should understand supply and resupply after they defeated Napoleon Bonaparte, and later Adolph Hitler by causing the enemy to extend its supply lines to a point they could not resupply effectively, then performing denial operations, cutting the enemy’s lines of supply.  

We have never been told who destroyed the Nord stream pipeline or who carried out the drone attacks on the Russian capital. Some chatter is currently saying the Ukrainians destroyed the pipeline and Russians sympathetic to the Ukraine attacked the Kremlin. We may not know for sure for decades who carried out the attacks.

Let’s hope the professors from the American War College, Command and General Staff College and Service Academies are in Ukraine studying the new paradigm of warfare. It’s time to rewrite the textbooks on war.

My opinion, please differ if you wish.