Barry Hastings: Cuba Libre,´ the Bay of No Return, Part 1

By Barry Hastings

The agonies of Cuba begmuckrakersan on a bright sunny morning in 1492, when three small ships (one much smaller than what we’d today call a ‘small’ yacht) of “the Great Navigator,” Christopher Columbus, blundered into the largest island of the West Indies group, some 90 miles off the south coast of what’s now known as Florida. The people Columbus’ crews found there were Arawak Indians, a gentle people, from that point in time, doomed to be much exploited by the Spanish King, the Catholic Church, Spanish merchants (and others who followed) since 1511, until they were all but exterminated by the time the first black slaves arrived from Africa (in Spanish, English, and Dutch vessels), from 1523 onward.

(My own ancestor – through the English Greys — Francis Drake {Grandma called him a “nasty old Pirate”}, was later a part of the trade. That despite being a great English “Sea-dog,” circum-navigator of the globe, and hero of the Great Armada battle of 1588 in the English Channel, himself.)

Today, Arawak bloodlines have all but disappeared in the Cuban population (and across most of Latin America). It was the beginning of Spanish and Portuguese extermination of Native American bloodlines across southern North America, Latin and South America, that killed millions (mostly through slave labor in mines), and stole billions of dollars in precious metals, gemstones, valuable spices and other commodities highly valued in Europe.

After the Spanish and Portuguese departed the scenes, the murder of peoples, ravaging of their lands, was continued by white European immigrants who settled to the north. Their merchants proved as greedy (and murderous) as their Spanish and Portuguese fore-runners.

Cuba proved to be no exception to the rule. (You must also remember, our “Puritan” ancestors did much the same thing, though by sending their sick and dying to spread disease through our own Native American villages.)

But we must get back to Cuba. Slavery officially was outlawed in Cuba in 1836, but unofficially continued until the island was ceded to the U.S. by Spain, after their defeat in the “Splendid Little War” of 1898. A Cuban Republic was proclaimed in 1901, but the U. S. demanded, and retained, the right to intervene in island affairs until 1934. A (U.S-backed) Cuban army Sergeant, Fulgencio Batista, backed by armed Cuban followers, grabbed the reins of island leadership in 1933. He remained in power until he retired in 1944.

In 1952, Batista, backed again by the U.S. (and by the Mafia who made him rich), and in a basically (but not completely) bloodless coup, regained power. This time he imposed a regime many Cubans found to be oppressive and without a trace of democracy. The regime was based on the wants and needs of wealthy planters, and the American Mob. A poorly trained, and often vicious military force, and secret police action were standard tools he used against dissenters. Jails, prison, labor gangs and the firing-squad, were generally the fate of trouble makers, complainers and political opponents. He seemed to have the full backing of the U.S. government.

In 1953, a young lawyer named Fidel Castro, son of a wealthy planter and businessman, attempted a coup, backed by his brother Raul, and a small group of supporters. They attacked a Cuban military barracks, and failed (miserably). He was jailed then went into exile in Mexico and the U.S. It must have been in this time period, he being (like many young Cubans) a pretty good baseball player, tried out with the New York Yankees baseball team, without positive result. He was well-educated in Jesuit schools, and studied law at the University of Havana. He was strongly opposed to Batista’s (pretty much) criminal regime.

In 1956, he attempted a “secret” landing on Cuban soil, was quickly interdicted, and all but about a dozen of his backers were killed by Batista’s army. Castro, his brother Raul, their friend Ernesto “Che” Guevara (Castro’s “Leon Trotsky”), and nearly a dozen others, escaped into the Sierra Maestra hills, where over a short period of time (less than three years), they built a guerrilla force of some 5,000 men. Late in 1958, they launched an attack on Havana, and in early January, defeated Batista’s military there, and chased the dictator out of the nation (but with a huge stash of Mafia money). He never came back.

Castro’s first acts were to seize the property of the Mob, rich Americans, Rich Cubans and any other wealth he could lay his hands on. With ruthlessness that shaded Batista, he suspended Habeas Corpus, established military tribunals across the country, and suspended the right to appeal criminal court sentences. Shortly afterward, he recognized Communist China, then, infuriating to President Eisenhower, claimed the U.S. was, “A vulture, feeding on humanity.”

The United States government, in particular, was outraged in the extreme, and immediately severed diplomatic relations, imposed an economic blockade, then made many attempts to subvert the island nation’s economy. Castro retaliated by declaring Cuba a Marxist-Leninist state, and establishing a trade treaty with the Soviet Union.

The Russians quickly became Cuba’s major trade partner. They began providing economic and military aid, which Fidel used to build up the strongest military force in the region. Cuban humanists were outraged. Hundreds were jailed (or worse). Thousands fled to Florida. (And there they remain.)

“Land Ho! Enter the Bay of Pigs”

The Bay of Pigs is an inlet on Cuba’s southern coast about 90 miles Southwest of Havana. It is the site of an unsuccessful invasion attempt by 1,500 Cuban exiles, trained by the CIA, and U.S. military officers and non-coms. They landed on April 17, 1961. By April 20, all were either dead (some 200), captives of the Cuban military (1173), or running for their lives.

The creation of the invasion force had been approved by President Eisenhower when Castro cold-shouldered Ike’s last attempt toward reconciliation and understanding, on March 17, 1960. The group of young volunteers who “passed muster” were named the July 26 Movement and the CIA tried to convince them a “rich Cuban was footing the bills.” The Cubans smirked, and joked among themselves that the rich Cuban was named, “Uncle Sam.”

Security, it seems, was a bit lax. CIA men told them they all risked prison if the FBI learned what was happening. The group was split between older, and younger men. The younger would do the actual fighting, and were known as La Brigada. In Miami, the older men formed a political front, the Frente, to replace Castro’s government. It proved to be “leaky as a sieve,” but couldn’t reveal much because it knew nothing about the planned operation. To deceive Castro’s agents, serial numbers of the fighting men began at 2500, and the unit took the number of the first recruit to die in training (there were several) as their unit name, 2506. Their emblem, worn on uniforms, and emblazoned on a battle banner, was the number 2506, superimposed on a cross. They were told that after eight weeks of “Guerrilla Warfare” training they’d be transferred to Guatemala, to train a larger force.

Several security breaches occurred. The first involved a Cuban given money by the CIA to lease the resort island of Useppa, in the Gulf of Mexico. That didn’t fly a foot. A U.S. Air Force C-54 cargo plane was brought in, and flew them to Fort Gulick in the Panama Canal Zone. They weren’t supposed to know where they were, but a CIA instructor left a Panama City newspaper lying around in their rec room, and the canal itself was visible from a window. The Army and Marine Corps veterans training them, mostly highly decorated World War II veterans, according to decorated WWII Marine, historian William Manchester, “tended to be high in personal courage, but low in good judgement,” often selecting training sites in a manner, “almost haphazard.”

In August 1960, the “special group” running the show from D.C. began having second thoughts about landing these eager-to-fight young soldiers in Cuba. Castro’s army now numbered some 400,000 soldiers and militiamen, and they were very well equipped with the best arms the Soviet Union could provide — more than 28,000 tons worth. Because of an excellent, well-trained coastal and anti-aircraft watch corps on the island, providing supplies by sea or air, could, and likely would, prove dangerous and expensive. Events the next year proved truth of the thesis. (I wonder the operation was ever allowed to move past this point.) Yankee cockiness, I guess.

Moving forward; The great invasion launched

Into the Valley of Death rode the 1500. At 5:30 a.m., Sunday, May 1, 1960, in Peshawar, Pakistan, a pilot named Francis Gary Powers climbed into a very high-flying (U-2) recon plane. At the altitude it would reach, no known missile could reach U-2, #360. This day, a previously unknown (to the Western world) missile would reach it, and would bring the airplane crashing to earth in Russia.

Powers (very luckily surviving the strike) floated to earth under a parachute, in the same dangerous nation. As his plane began going cra2y and uncontrollable, Powers’ first thought was, “My God, I’ve had it, now!” What an uproar it caused, globally. What long range consequences… in the end, very nearly (a cat’s whisker close) bringing on a nuclear World War III (attention current President-elect of the United States of America — don’t play with fire).

Despite the uproar after the U-2 incident, eleven months later, in April 1961, the Spooky Boys were prepared to move forward with the Bay of Pigs operation. It was scheduled to launch on April 17, near dawn.

While all this was happening, the 1960 presidential campaign had been run, and won by JFK. During that time, the Brigada had moved to new training grounds in Nicaragua, and despite doubts among the ‘special group’, they’d thought more about the “plan” and decided the answer was an amphibious operation, landing in the bay from boats, with tactical air support by Cuban pilots flying American aircraft. They pointed to the many successful amphibious operations during WWII, and General MacArthur’s success at Inchon, North Korea. No one pointed out that Cuban forces were minute compared to MacArthur’s, about the size of an American Infantry Battalion, and nowhere near as well trained or well armed, to say nothing of their inexperience. Nor did they mention that American amphibious operations were always backed by air superiority, adequate integrated artillery, and many warships off-shore to provide heavy artillery support.

But the spooks were confident they’d found the answer to their dilemma. They abandoned all thought of the Brigada forming up on landing into guerrilla bands, who’d train other bands; and came to believe once it was established ashore, Cubans would flock to their banner. The Brigada members swallowed it all — hook, line, sinker. They believed the change in plan meant American soldiers would land “hot on their heels.” It was never, for a moment, in the cards. It was, in fact, unthought of. Their CIA advisers never informed them of the truth. Many other shenanigans occurred as well, none of them to the credit of CIA operatives.

All this time, though, through the end of the Eisenhower administration, into the Kennedy’s, the most horrible squabbles had raged over the spy flight of Francis Gary Powers. It was the the worst diplomatic dispute of the Cold War. (You’ll have to look elsewhere for that story, as I’m writing about Cuba, the Bay of Pigs, and, eventually, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which is yet a great number of lines in the future.)

After a week in office, the new President, JFK, had first learned of plans for the Bay of Pigs op from CIA Director Allen Dulles, and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman, General Lyman Lemnitzer briefed  top dogs in the new administration on Nov. 29, 1960. The CIA assured Kennedy there were “no loose threads,” but one observer believed the President was, “wary and reserved in his reaction.” With only a week in his new position at the time, he wanted to to “think about it.” But Dulles told him he, “wouldn’t have much time,” because Castro was about to receive some MIG fighters from the Russians; in fact, had pilots already in Czechoslovakia, training to fly them. They also told him the invasion Brigada was well trained and “ready to fight.” Dulles also told him the “liberation of Cuba” awaited a single word from the President. General Lemnitzer insisted the plan would work. Slowly, surely, and under a lot of pressure, Kennedy came around.

On Monday, April 10, the invasion Brigada began moving from their final training ground in Nicaragua. Four days later (Thursday), they boarded their boats. On Friday, the CIA assigned their landing areas, three beaches inside the Bay of Pigs. At about noon, Sunday, they passed the point of “no return.”

Cuba Libre: the bay of no returnlarry-hamp

The first setback for the invaders at the Bay of Pigs came from the sky. The CIA appraisals of the Cuban Air Force were somewhat off center. Their combat efficiency was rated “near zero.” They claimed Cuban aircraft were obsolete and often inoperative. It’s command and control facilities were said to be, “entirely disorganized.” The truth was that Castro had 15 U.S. built WWII B-26 bombers (not a bad aircraft considering the attackers only had eight of the same model, and those in much worse shape than those of Castro’s force, which had tail-Turrets, while the attackers had removed theirs to carry more fuel). The attackers had no fighters, while Castro’s force had ten British-built Sea-Furies, a respectable WWII Royal Navy fighter, and four U.S. built armed T-33 Trainers, much faster than any of the rest of the aircraft engaged.

The CIA had scheduled attacks on Castro’s air force for two days before the invasion, Saturday the 15th. It was carried out by eight rather rickety B-26 bombers, with a third of their armament removed for extra fuel storage. Several of them had engine problems of one kind or another. The CIA claimed heavy damage was inflicted, but it wasn’t deadly. Castro was left with six B-26s, two Sea-Furies, and two T-33 jets. Air superiority remained with Castro’ forces. STRIKE ONE!

For some unknown (and foolish) reason, all of the attackers’ supplies had been loaded into one of six very old and rusty freighters, the Rio Escondito. The six old freighters in the flotilla (if we can give it such a name), and two small escort vessels, were not ships we’d send Americans to war in. All were as old and rusty as the Escondito, which had also been damaged coming down the Mississippi river when she hit a log, and bent her propeller. She was only marginally manageable under way. Her engines were also said to be “temperamental,” and she sailed with a distinct list. On Tuesday, Rio Escondito was attacked by one of Castro’s T-33 jets, and hit by a rocket, or rockets. She burst into flame, then disintegrated in a ball of fire. Ammunition, food supplies and everything else the invaders required to survive, was lost. All the other ships fled immediately, leaving the invaders stranded on the beach. STRIKE TWO!

Deserted by their transport vessels, with only 10% of their ammunition supply ashore, things appeared bleak indeed for the attackers. They were, indeed. Still, when Castro’s army attacked, They killed (according to a Cuban military doctor) at least 500, and wounded nearly 1,000.

They also threw back an attack by 20 tanks. It was not enough. Castro’s subordinates, slowly but surely, reduced the Brigada’s numbers and ammunition supply. A last attack by two Brigada B-26 bombers, was destroyed by the remaining two T-33s.

The last message from the invading force was received at 4:32 p.m., Wednesday. It read, “Am destroying all of my equipment and communications. Tanks are in sight. I have nothing to fight with. Am taking to the woods. I cannot wait for you.” STRIKE THREE!

The invaders remained in prison under harsh conditions after being publicly tried and humiliated, ’til Christmas, 1962, when Robert F. Kennedy, and James Donovan raised nearly 60 million dollars to ransom them.

After the debacle at the Bay of Pigs, David Halberstam would write, “How a president who seemed so contemporary could agree to a plan so obviously doomed to failure, a plan based on so little understanding of the situation, was astounding.”

Also afterward, JFK asked Ted Sorenson, “How could I have been so far off base? All my life I’ve known better than to trust the experts. How could I have been so stupid as to let them go ahead?”

Arthur Schlesinger noted, “The incredulous President would bring up the Bay of Pigs, wondering how a rational and responsible government could ever have become involved in so ill-starred an adventure?

The answer, of course, is easy now. He allowed himself to be rushed into a move, about which his first reaction had been negative, by men who had, “an axe to grind.” After a while such projects become the child of those who created them. The last minute changes in plans and objectives, were fatal to an already badly flawed idea. Kennedy accepted CIA’s claim that, should the attack fail to draw Cubans in, the attackers could, “just melt into the woods and begin a low-key infiltration.”

Complicated plans cannot be revised so quickly, or easily. (BH)

-End of ‘Cuba Libre’, Part One-

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